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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
prior to the amendment, it was held that these proceedings were not
of a criminal nature as they have been shifted to the civil side of the
courts and that the acts involved were to be treated as civil offenses
inasmuch as the Domestic Relations Court is not a criminal court.12
However, the cases mentioned supra do not hold that the state legis-
lature has not the power to confer criminal jurisdiction upon this
court if it so desires. Besides Article 6, Section 18 of the New York
Constitution 13 specifically empowers the legislature to confer suchjurisdiction as may be necessary to punish offenses of adults who con-
tribute to juvenile delinquency and thereby impliedly gives the legis-
lature authority to confer criminal jurisdiction on the Domestic Re-
lations Court.
H. R. K.
EMINENT DOMAIN-ESCHEAT-MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.-
By a holographic will, deceased attempted to convey a life interest in
property located in New York City to his illegitimate daughter and
the fee to his daughter-in-law, petitioner herein. The will was invalid
because it was not witnessed in accordance with the laws of New
York. The daughter as sole heir was barred from taking by intestacy
by reason of her illegitimacy, and as a result, the property escheated
to the state. The illegitimate daughter died in 1912. In 1916 while
title was in the state, the City of New York acquired title to part of
the property by condemnation. In 1918, the legislature, acting upon
a petition of the daughter-in-law, passed a special act which author-
ized the commissioners of the land office to release to her all the prop-
erty of the intestate which had escheated to the state. In 1919, the
city made an award for the property condemned and in the same
decree levied an assessment for benefit against the portion which the
city had not condemned. In 1924 the Supreme Court ruled that the
legislature had released the interest held by the state by the passage
of the special act. Petitioner did not make application pursuant to
the special act until 1933, at which time the commissioners passed
title to the land to her. Petitioner then made application for the
award. Petitioner claims that at the time of the condemnation title
was in the state; and since the city cannot condemn or assess state
property without the permission of the state, and such permission
was not given, the condemnation and assessment fall; but petitioner
may ratify the condemnation proceedings and claim the award apart
1269 N. Y. 13, 17, 198 N. E. 613, 615 (1935); 248 App. Div. 141, 288
N. Y. Supp. 900 (1st Dept. 1936).
" N. Y. CONST. art. VI, § 18: "The legislature may establish ** * courts
of domestic relations * * * and may confer on them such jurisdiction as may
be necessary * * * for the punishment of adults contributing to such delinquency,
neglect or dependency."
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from the assessment. From a judgment of the Appellate Division'
reversing a judgment of the Special Term in favor of the city, the
city appeals. Order of Appellate Division modified and as modified
affirmed, held, the legislature by passing the special act vested title to
the land in petitioner in 1918 and as the award and assessment were
made concurrently and while petitioner had title, the assessment for
benefit is deductible from the award. lit re Quinlan, 271 N. Y. 396,
3 N. E. (2d) 569 (1936).
If a woman dies without lawful issue, leaving an illegitimate child,
the inheritance descends to him as if he were legitimate. In any other
case illegitimate children or relatives do not inherit.2 All lands, title
to which fails from a defect or heirs, revert or escheat to the people.5
Title to land escheated to the state begins from the date of intestate's
death.
A municipality being a creature of the state cannot exercise the
power of eminent domain against land owned by the state without its
express permission.4 In the instant case, no permission was granted
by the state to allow condemnation of the land to which it had .title;
therefore, the condemnation proceedings were ineffective as to the
state. But when petitioner sued for the award, she thereby ratified
the condemnation proceedings.5
Where the expense of making a public improvement is assessed
against the property benefited by the improvement, the assessment is
an exercise of.the power of taxation, a power separate and distinct
from the exercise of the power of eminent domain. 6 The power of
assessment cannot be exercised against the state unless notice is given
pursuant to Public Land Laws, Section 19. An assessment can be
made only against property benefited by the improvement; 7 it cannot
be in excess of the benefits received; 8 and must be paid in cash.9
Early cases 10 in New York held that benefits to land, remaining
after condemnation, held by the landowner, may be deducted from
the compensation for the property actually taken. Later cases 11 have
'246 App. Div. 290, 285 N. Y. Supp. 419 (1st Dept. 1936).
3 N. Y. DECENT EsTATE LAW § 583.8 N. Y. CoNsT. art. I, §§ 10, 11, 12; the state as the ultimate heir is the
ultimate owner.
'In re Cruger, 84 N. Y. 619, 143 N. E. 799 (1881).5 A mortgagee by bringing an action against the city to recover damages
for the taking of the mortgaged lands affirms the title acquired by the city.
Merreman v. City of N. Y., 227 N. Y. 279, 125 N. E. 500 (1919) ; Catskills etc.
Ass'n v. Greene, 155 Misc. 492, 280 N. Y. Supp. 598 (1935).
'In re Nunez, 226 N. Y. 246, 123 N. E. 492 (1919).
'Henderson Bridge Co. v. Henderson, 173 U. S. 592, 19 Sup. Ct. 553
(1898); 20 C. J. 528.
'Matter of Tuthill, 36 App. Div. 492, 55 N. Y. Supp. 657 (2d Dept. 1899).
'People ex iel. Post v. City of Brooklyn, 6 Barb. 209 (N. Y. 1849).
"People v. Brooklyn, 4 N. Y. 419 (1851) ; 20 C. J. 815.
'Sloane v. N. Y. El. R. Co., 137 N. Y. 595, 33 N. E. 335 (1893) ; N. Y.
CONDEMNATION LAW § 14. The reasons given are: (a) compensation must be
paid in money, not benefits; (b) landowner might be compelled to pay a double
share of the cost of improvement, first by a deduction from his award and
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reached a contrary conclusion and the rule is settled that land actually
taken must be paid for in full without reference to benefits. The
assessment against land remaining after condemnation may be set off
against the claim for compensation for the land condemned.
An assessment is made against the land, not against the owner,
and usually title is of little consequence. 12 An assessment becomes a
lien on the land against which the assessment is made.13 It is sub-
mitted that if title to the property remaining after condemnation was
in the state at the time of the assessment, the assessment would fail, not
because there was an intrinsic invalidity in the assessment itself, but
because it was made against a party which was exempt from assess-
ments, except under certain conditions which were not complied with
here. When the state transferred its title to petitioner, the only
obstacle (ownership by state) which had prevented the assessment
from becoming a valid lien on the land and had rendered the assess-
ment invalid was removed, and the land became burdened with a lien.
Although the state could have accepted the award without paying the
assessment, 14 the right is personal to the state and a transfer of its
interest does not entitle the transferee to the same position occupied by
the state. In the instant case, the assessment for benefit was made
while title was in the petitioner, not in the state as she claims; the
assessment is therefore valid. 15, The exercise of the powers of assess-
ment and eminent domain are so interlinked that the recipient of the
condemnation award cannot take it without subjecting herself to the
obligation of paying the assessment. 6
It is well settled that where an assessment is irregular (but not
to an extent which will render it void) and a property owner has
accepted an award 1- or the benefits 18 of the improvement for which
second by an assessment on his adjoining property; (c) there is no duty upon
the city to continue the public use, the benefits accruing are thus uncertain while
the loss is definite and certain.
Brooklyn etc. Co. v. Bird, 78 Misc. 683, 138 N. Y. Supp. 826 (1912).
GREATER N. Y. CH.TR § 1017; N. Y. Laws 1916, c. 602, § 7; Lewis v.
Utica, 67 Barb. 459 (N. Y. 1877).
:'In re Melrose Ave., 234 N. Y. 48, 136 N. E. 235 (1922) ; N. Y. PERs.
PROP. LAW § 19.
2 The omission to award damages to the owner of property is an objection
which cannot be raised after confirmation of the assessment. The omission to
make such an award cannot be properly called- a substantial error in making
the assessment. Notwithstanding such omission the assessment itself may be
entirely regular and accurate. The petitioner is not harmed by the assessment.
It is by an omission back of that and which preceded it. In re Cruger, 84 N. Y.
619, 143 N. E. 799 (1881).
"'Genet v. City of Brooklyn, 99 N. Y. 296, 1 N. E. 777 (1885) (Court
upheld a legislative direction setting off, against an award made to an individual
for lands taken for public use, an assessment for benefit against his other lands
made in the same proceedings).
1 Where a property owner has accepted an award for the condemnation of
his land, he is estopped from denying the validity of an assessment for benefits
conferred upon him by the improvement. Stockton v. Newark, 58 N. J. L. 116,
32 Ati. 67 (1895).
"Johnston v. Hartford, 96 Conn. 142, 113 Atl. 273 (1921).
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his property is assessed he is estopped from denying the validity of
the assessment for benefit. It is the general rule that when the assess-
ment is void, the property owner is not estopped from denying its
validity even though he has accepted the benefits of the improvement.
Cases in New York are conflicting on this point, some cases holding
that the doctrine of estoppel will apply even where the assessment is
void,2 0 and others adhering to the general rule.
21
B. B.
EMINENT DOMAIN-WHAT CONSTITUTES PUBLIC UsE.-The
Commissioner of Parks, upon authorization of the Board of Estimate
and Apportionment, instituted this action to condemn certain prop-
erties adjacent to the Flushing Meadow Park to be used temporarily
as a parking space for the proposed New York World's Fair and to
be used thereafter as a park and playground. The owners of this land
oppose the action on the ground that it is a taking of private land for
private rather than public use and furthermore that there is no need
for this additional land. Held, application to vest title to the land in
the city, granted. The legislature's determination that land is neces-
sary for public use may not be questioned by the court. The court
may question whether the use is public or private in nature. Tempo-
rarily setting aside a portion of a public park to be used as a parking
space in connection with a fair and' later to be used as a park and
playground, is a public use. Matter of Flushing Meadow Park (Sup.
Ct. Queens), New York Law Journal, October 19, 1936.
The city of New York has the power to condemn private prop-
erty for a public purpose.1 The determination of the legislature as
to the necessity for such land is not reviewable by the court.2  The
" Owners of property who were specially assessed for an authorized street
improvement were estopped from raising the objection that the city had not
condemned the land, had not made awards to the owners and had not acquired
title to the land on which the improvement was made. The court held that the
owners have and enjoy the improvement and cannot justly claim to be relieved
from payment of the benefits assessed against such property. Boyton v. People,
159 Ill. 553, 42 N. E. 842 (1896) ; Holms v. Village etc., 121 Ill. 128, 13 N. E.
540 (1887) (remedy would be to sue for the awards that would have resulted
from a condemnation).
People v. Many, 89 Hun 138, 35 N. Y. Supp. 78 (1895).
' In re Sharpe, 56 N. Y. 257 (1874).
'CHARTER OF THE CITY OF NEw YORK § 970 (L. 1901, c. 466, amd. by L.
1913, c. 329).
'Matter of Fowler, 53 N. Y. 60 (1873); Matter of Church Street, 49
Barb. 455 (N. Y. 1867); Harris v. Thompson, 9 Barb. 350 (N. Y. 1850);
People v. Smith, 21 N. Y. 595 (1860) ; Matter of Cooper, 28 Hun 515 (N. Y.
1883) ; Matter of Peter Townsend, 39 N. Y. 171 (1868); Matter of Sacket
Street, 74 N. Y. 95 (1878); Matter of Boston Road, 142 App. Div. 726,
1937]
